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A commentary on
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tualizing evolutionary psychology
by Barrett, L., Pollet, T. V., and Stulp,
G. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:867. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00867
I argue that Barrett et al. (2014) have mis-
interpreted evolutionary psychologists’
notion of computation. Barrett et al.
seemingly presume that the notion of
computation deployed by evolutionary
psychologists (e.g., Pinker, 1997; Tooby
and Cosmides, 2005) is tantamount to
positing a physical architecture whose
form of computation proceeds via the
syntactic-like transformations of spa-
tially discrete representational symbols
or sentence-like structures—i.e., in the
manner of a Turing machine. But this is
simply not the notion of computation that
evolutionary psychologists advocate (in
spite of the fact that a Turing machine
architecture, for instance, is nonetheless
compatible with it).
The notion of computation is
philosophically complex, with many dif-
ferent meanings and amultifaceted history
(Piccinini, 2012). By “computation,” evo-
lutionary psychologists fundamentally
mean to say that the brain evolved to
compute in the generic sense of the term.
This more generic notion of computation,
and its relation to a physical substrate, is
outlined by Pinker (2005):
“Computation” . . . does not refer to
what a commercially available digital
computer does but to a more generic
notion of mechanical rationality . . . .
In this conception, a computational sys-
tem is one in which knowledge and
goals are represented as patterns in
bits of matter (“representations”). (p. 2,
emphasis added)
The misunderstanding of what evolution-
ary psychologists mean by computation
also leads Barrett et al. to view various
other conceptions of cognition—
i.e., embodied, embedded, extended,
enactive—as alternatives to the compu-
tational approach when, in actuality, they
can easily be seen as complementary to
it. For evolutionary psychologists are pri-
marily focused on the functional level
of analysis of psychological adaptations
rather than their physical instantiations
(i.e., their causal–physical basis in the
brain, body, and wider environment).
And this focus on the functional level
of analysis allows researchers to investigate
psychological adaptations in a manner
that abstracts away from their instan-
tiations in the brain, body, and larger
context (i.e., ecological) in which they are
embedded. The modular, computational
framework of evolutionary psychology
is quite compatible with, and can be
meaningfully situated within, an over-
all physical and causal account that is
highly complex, widely distributed, and
highly diffuse. So, far from invalidating
or highlighting a “prejudice” inherent
to computationalism or evolutionary
psychology, the supposed alternative
approach that Barrett et al. advocate is
rather a difference of focus and empha-
sis. For there is nothing within the
theoretical approach of evolutionary
psychology that in principle denies the
existence of the kinds of “E-cognition”
that Barrett et al. draw attention to. At
a pragmatic level, different research pro-
grams will simply find it profitable to
have differing explanatory focuses and
emphases.
Barrett et al. also raise skepticism
regarding the relationship between psy-
chological adaptations and their neurobi-
ological underpinnings. But it is impor-
tant to note that the form–function fit
that evolutionary psychologists focus on
qua adaptationists pertains most directly
to aspects of “psychological design” rather
than to properties of the neurobiologi-
cal realization of those designs. Thus, the
reverse-engineering approach accordingly
homes in on the psychological level of
analysis and not the neurobiological one
(or at least not primarily). More gener-
ally, at this stage of the game it is pre-
mature to draw overly strict conclusions
on precisely how psychological adapta-
tions may or may not be instantiated in
the brain—e.g., if and how they are “mul-
tiply realizable” by neurobiological bases,
and whether to interpret neuroimaging
results according to a regionally-focused or
network-wide perspective, etc. (e.g., Klein,
2012; Colombo, 2013).
Barrett and colleagues’ discussion of
human nature is also problematic. For
instance, they endorseWheeler and Clark’s
(2008) conception of human nature as
“a kind of meta-nature . . . an extended
cognitive architecture whose constancy
lies mainly in its continual openness to
change” (p. 3572) and lead the reader
to believe that it is necessarily at vari-
ance with the notion of human nature
alluded to by evolutionary psychologists.
On the contrary, however, evolutionary
psychologists recognize this underlying
constancy and refer to it as our underlying
“developmental programs” (e.g., Tooby
et al., 2003). For evolutionary psycholo-
gists, human nature is tantamount to the
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ontogenesis of our species-typical psycho-
logical adaptations. On this view, human
nature is envisioned as being expressed
through development in ways that are
guided, generative, and constrained. The
precise details of how guided, generative,
and constrained this underlying nature is
are of course a complex empirical matter
that has barely just commenced, scientifi-
cally speaking. At any rate, abstractly mod-
eling postulated psychological adaptations
in computational terms is an invaluable
method of investigation (see Barrett, 2006,
2007; Bechtel, 2007; Tooby and Cosmides,
2008; Frankenhuis et al., 2013; Levy and
Bechtel, 2013).
Indeed, evolutionary psychologists
argue that our developmental programs
should be computationally mapped in
ever-increasing detail, ultimately yielding
a high-resolution map of human nature.
Barrett et al. claim that human nature
can be “cultivated,” shaped, and refracted
(etc.). But the extent to which this is possi-
ble is ultimately an empirical question, and
the more we can understand the nature of
our developmental programs, the less need
we will have for such vague notions. And
in any case, however much we can cul-
tivate our developmental programs, they
are fundamentally a product of past selec-
tion and thus cannot be adapted—in the
adaptationist sense—to present and future
conditions (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides,
1990).
Barrett et al. also crucially omit cer-
tain aspects of evolutionary psychologists’
treatment of culture. To wit, Barrett et al.
imply that evolutionary psychologists can-
not account for the way in which material
artifacts, beliefs, and so forth, interact with
the underlying developmental programs
undergirding our species-typical cognitive
architecture. To the contrary: evolution-
ary psychologists’ notion of epidemiolog-
ical culture refers both to the transmission
of culture between individual minds and
its impact on the cognitive architecture of
those minds (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992;
Sperber, 1996). Furthermore, models of
epidemiological culture can, in principle,
be as complex and dynamic as need be.
Hence, the allegations by Barrett et al.
that evolutionary psychology is inconsis-
tent with or fails in principle to account for
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